Market Garden Anniversary : Disposition of Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen'

**Josef Weiss** · 09-18-2018, 11:40 PM

Operation Market Garden : 74th Anniversary

Disposition of Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen'

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With the 70th anniversary of the thwarted Operation Market Garden just passing yesterday, I thought it was important to bring to you all a short excerpt on the disposition of the divisional forces that we strive to portray; 9.SS Pz.Div. 'Hohenstaufen', upon the onset of the Operation. This will help to solidify your 'reenactor' mindset and gain a valuable snap-shot into the past.

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''The 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen' and it's Panzerkorps' sister unit 'Frundsberg' had been collecting in the area of Sittard, north of Maastricht, after the mass exodus of France was complete via the Falaise Gap. On September 7th, 'Hohenstaufen' was ordered to detach a Kampfgruppe, including a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery under SS-Hauptsturmführer Segler, to Valkenswaard (where it would later go on and fight under Kampfgruppe Walther). The rest of the Division, what was left of it anyway, drove through Venlo and Nijmegen to its prepared assembly areas north and east of Arnhem. The Division was in urgent need of reorganization.

It had sustained massive casualties throughout the fighting in France, and was overall reduced to about 20-30 percent of its original strength. The men of 'Hohenstaufen' had been in action without pause or reinforcements since the end of June. Losses in Officers and NCOs had been especially high. Most of the logistic elements and baggage had already arrived at the beginning of September. Model's original intention had been to replenish both divisions at the front and thereby quickly form an Army Group reserve. Material would have been directly transported from the Reich. Personnel losses, however, had been so great that it was decided to replenish one division - 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg' - on the spot, at the front, and the 9.SS would be sent back to Siegen, Germany for replenishing. 'Frundsberg' was ultimately chosen to remain in Arnhem because its first tank battalion was about to be equipped with new Panther tanks.

As the replenishment process was unlikely in view of the operational situation to be allowed to continue undisturbed, 'Hohenstaufen' was instructed to hand over all of its heavy equipment to 'Frundsberg'. This order was received with mixed feelings. The veteran officers and NCOs understood the totality and implications behind an order like that, and were reluctant to hand over its weapons and equipment when the situation could still unpredictably change. Many of the vehicles had been carefully husbanded throughout the retreat from Normandy. Future events would go on to prove that their fears had not been groundless. The reorganization process continued.

On September 12th the advance parties, quartermasters, and technical personnel of 'Hohenstaufen' began to entrain for Siegen, Germany. The troops couldn't have been any more excited. SS-Hauptsturmführer Moeller would go on to write about this in his war diary stating "Understandably, the move into the Reich was the number one talking point !". By September 17th, 'Hohenstaufen had been reduced to the size of a weak Brigage, with less equipment than 'Frundsberg', as most had already been handed over, or loaded on trains for the journey back to the Reich. At this point, it became misleading to categorize 'Hohenstaufen' as a Division. The forces of the 9.SS would be re-designated collectively as 'Kampfgruppe Hohenstaufen' until it was pulled off the front in November 1944.

Throughout all of the hustle and bustle, Model was still quite wary of an Airborne attack, and so he ordered that 'Hohenstaufen's fighting units would depart last. Meanwhile, battalions were formed into Alarmeinheiten in order to combat any such eventuality. On paper, the Kampfgruppe could muster 19 quick reaction company strength groups, spread over 12 locations, numbering an approximate total of 2500 men. The maximum distance over which these units would be required to react to landings west of Arnhem was 23km, nut an average of around 10 to 15km; which was 2 hours heavily laden on foot, or 30 minutes by vehicle(s). Apart from being veteran Panzer formations, both 'Frundsberg' and 'Hohenstaufen' had been specifically trained for an anti-airborne role. Indeed the IISS Panzerkorps had, from birth, been formed to deal with an anticipated invasion of the west. Under the expert tutelage of the then 'General der Panzertruppen West' General Geyr von Schweppenburg, both divisions had trained to repel airborne landings, while awaiting delivery of its heavy equipment. During the summer of 1943, invasion 'alarms' had been practiced in all 9.SS and 10.SS units. In September of that same year, 'Hohenstaufen' specifically had undergone a testing anti-airborne exercise that was pronounced a success.

Month long exercises dealt with practical night and live firing maneuvers. Aggressive reactions were instilled into commanders, who were taught to attack from the line of march, and bring every weapon immediately to bear. The German tactical thought process was to drive into the teeth of an airborne landing with great decisiveness, in order to defeat it. Companies were trained in repelling raids and engaging in anti-partisan operations. The enemy had to be hit at it's weakest point, upon landing, before it had a chance to assemble. Numerically stronger forces, in such a scenario, should be engaged.The fragmented distribution of Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen' , organized as quick reaction companies, was not therefore regarded as a particularly unusual or disadvantageous tactic. Locations of these 9.SS forces were picked to capitalize upon the numerous good roads in the Arnhem area. Most units were billeted in villages along the Arnhem-Velp-Apeldoorn. Experience suggested the avoidance of large towns, like Arnhem itself, as uprisings by the Resistance, already encountered in Paris, Brussels, etc could pin down large numbers of troops.

As a brief summary - Accounting for 'Hohenstaufen' as well as 'Frundsberg', the disposition of this IISS-Panzerkorps on September 17th, 1944 consisted of some 5,500 infantry with a fairly limited number of armoured vehicles. The geographical distribution of the refitting units did much to aid the speed of the German reaction to the British landings near Arnhem. The 9.SS were the closest - with a total of 19 companies, poised to react within 30 minutes, by vehicle or up to 2 hours on foot. If the British landed closer to the Arnhem Bridge, these reaction times would of been even more reduced. The British First Airborne jumped into a hornest's nest.''

It Never Snow's in September : The German View of MARKET-GARDEN and the Battle of Arnhem by Robert J. Kershaw

Retake Arnhem Bridge: A History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Scott Revell and Bob Gerritsen